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Election Hacking: A Trifecta of Sovereignty,
Intervention, and Use of Force Violations in
International Law
ARLEN PRINTZ*
INTRODUCTION
The 2016 United States Presidential election was riddled with
accusations of foreign interference ranging from propaganda, to
collusion with candidates, to tampering with the vote-counting systems
themselves.1 While the most serious of these allegations have not been
proven, the reality is that the U.S election infrastructure is vulnerable to
outside intrusion and even “vote flipping,” meaning the altering of
individual ballots.2 These vulnerabilities raise a new problem that must
be addressed under international law: if one State hacks into another
State’s election system and disrupts the infrastructure in such a way as
* Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, Class of 2019. B.A. in History and Minor in Russian 2013,
Occidental College. I would like to thank Professor David Glazier for advising me on this Note,
as well as the members of the ILR who made this publication possible.
1. See Aaron Mak, Evidence of Russian Election-Data Tampering Mounts as Urgency to
Investigate It Does Not, SLATE (Sept. 1, 2017, 3:10 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_
slatest/2017/09/01/did_russian_hacking_of_vr_systems_affect_election_in_durham_county_new
_york.html; see also Cynthia McFadden, William Arkin & Kevin Monahan, Russians Penetrated
U.S. Voter Systems, Top U.S. Official Says, NBC NEWS (Feb. 8, 2018, 7:28 AM), https://www.
nbcnews.com/politics/elections/russians-penetrated-u-s-voter-systems-says-top-u-s-n845721
(describing how Russia gained access to U.S voter rolls in a very select group of states after
initially targeting twenty-one of them).
2. See Election Infrastructure: Vulnerabilities and Solutions, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS
(Sept. 11, 2017, 5:43 PM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/democracy/reports/2017/09
/11/438684/election-infrastructure-vulnerabilities-solutions/ (“42 states use voting machines that
are more than a decade old . . . Outdated voting machines pose serious security risks and are
susceptible to system crashes, ‘vote flipping,’ and hacking.”); see also Tim Starks, Attack on
Commonly Used Voting Machine Could Tip an Election, Researchers Find, POLITICO (Sept. 27,
2018, 4:08 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/09/27/hacking-voting-machines-814504
(suggesting one model of vote tabulating machine used in 26 states have an “unpatched
vulnerability that the manufacturer was notified about a decade ago,” and another model used in
18 states that has vulnerabilities that hackers exploited to “gain physical access to a machine… in
just two minutes.”).
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to effectively control the outcome, specifically by altering the ballots
themselves and/or their totals, what international law violations do these
actions constitute? This note argues that such election hacking
constitutes a violation of sovereignty, an unlawful intervention under
international law, and should also constitute an unlawful use of force.
Only when international law accurately diagnoses the problem can it
begin to effectively solve and deter it.
State practice in the cyber context is very new and a lack of State
consensus in appropriate responses to various cyber-attacks makes it
difficult to determine what, if any, international law violations different
cyber-attacks constitute.3 Without a clear trend of State practice or
opinio juris relating to cyber-attack classifications and responses, on the
surface it seems as if there can be no established customary
international law relating to cyber-attacks. But if we analyze the cyber
aspect of the attack as a means to an end and instead focus on the nature
of the target and the seriousness of the attack’s effects, we can more
clearly see which areas of international law election hacking violates.
While this note only focuses on the most extreme, invasive forms of
election hacking, that does not mean that less serious forms of
interference cannot themselves be considered a violation of sovereignty,
unlawful intervention, or even a use of force. Instead, this note seeks to
establish a baseline by classifying the most serious form of election
hacking, which for the purposes of this note means altering the vote
totals or ballots themselves to control an election’s outcome.
The Tallinn Manual 2.0: On The International Law Applicable To
Cyber Warfare is persuasive authority that currently provides the most
widely recognized attempt to establish a framework on how to
categorize different cyber-attacks in the context of international law.4 In
2013 and again in 2017, a group of international law and cyber experts
came together on behalf of the Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of
Excellence (CCDCOE) to write the Tallinn Manual to advise NATO on
international legal issues raised by cyber-warfare.5 The Tallinn Manual
attempts to define existing international cyber obligations as well as
3. JOHANN-CHRISTOPH WOLTAG, CYBER WARFARE: MILITARY CROSS-BORDER
COMPUTER NETWORK OPERATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 147 (2014).
4. See Tallin Manual Process, NATO COOP. CYBER DEF. CTR. OF EXCELLENCE,
https://ccdcoe.org/tallinn-manual.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2018).
5. Fahmida Rashid, Security Think Tank Analyzes How International Law Applies to Cyber
War, SECURITY WK. (Sept. 04, 2012), https://www.securityweek.com/security-think-tankanalyzes-how-international-law-applies-cyber-war; see also Toomas Hendrick Ilves, Forward to
TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER WARFARE, at xiii
(Michael N. Schmitt & Liis Vihul eds., 2d ed. 2017).
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encourage the development of new international norms and treaty
provisions and apply them to the cyber context.6 Still, the Tallinn
Manual is not a definitive expression or source of law, and its influence
on the development of international law remains to be seen.7 While the
Tallinn Manual’s framework is sound, its experts overemphasize the
importance of kinetic damage over non-physical damage in the
application of their “effects” analysis.8 This emphasis on kinetic damage
leads its experts to misapply their framework and incorrectly conclude
that election hacking constitutes an unlawful intervention, but not a use
of force due to the lack of physical harm.9
International law does not necessarily require kinetic damage to
occur to classify a State act as a use of force. Article 2(4) of the U.N
Charter states that States may not use force against other States’
territorial integrity or their political independence.10 Political
independence is not a physical concept, and although physical invasions
constitute the most obvious threat to a country’s independence, so too
can non-kinetic assaults on a State’s Critical Infrastructure. 11 States
designate certain infrastructure as “critical” due to its importance to the
individual State,12 usually for its role in carrying out functions the State
deems “essential” or “vital” to its society, such as defense and, as this
note will argue, governing elections.13
Election hacking, by its nature, raises issues in the well-established
and overlapping principles of sovereignty, non-intervention, and the
prohibition of the use of force.14 This note therefore focuses on those
three principles as they relate to election hacking and argues that
6. Ilves, supra note 5, at xxiv.
7. Johann-Christoph Woltag, Cyber Warfare, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUB. INT’L
L., http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e280?prd
=EPIL (last updated Aug. 2015).
8. See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER
WARFARE, 333–334 (Michael N. Schmitt & Liis Vihul eds., 2d ed. 2017) [hereinafter TALLINN
MANUAL 2.0] (suggesting that any cyber-attack that causes physical damage to persons or
property will automatically constitute a use of force while non-kinetic attacks that, while they
may cause far more damage, must make it through a rigorous multi-part test to constitute a use of
force).
9. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 8, at 313.
10. Id., at 333; U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4.
11. Michael N. Schmitt, The Use of Cyber Force and International Law, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1113-14 (Marc Weller ed., 2015).
12. G.A Res. 58/199, Creation of a Global Culture of Cybersecurity and the Protection of
Critical Information Infrastructures, ¶ 4 (Jan. 30, 2004).
13. Council Directive 2008/114/EC, on the Identification and Designation of European
Critical Infrastructures and the Assessment of the Need to Improve their Protection, 2008 O.J. (L
345/75) (EC).
14. CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 76 (3rd ed. 2008).
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altering the ballots and/or vote totals constitutes a lex lata (law as it
exists) violation of sovereignty and unlawful intervention. Then, by
applying the Tallinn Manual’s existing consequence-based analytical
framework, this note will make a lex ferenda (law as it should be)
argument that international law should consider election hacking an
unlawful use of force that in some cases rises to the level of an armed
attack due to the grave consequences to a victim State’s sovereignty and
political independence.
Section I provides a historical overview of State interventions
organized from least to most invasive and analogizes each to its cyber
equivalent, where such an equivalent exists. Even though cyber-attacks
are a new phenomenon, State interference in each other’s internal
processes is not. International law should therefore view cyber-attacks
as a new means to familiar ends rather than as an entirely new problem
without historical analogy. This note argues that the closest historical
equivalent to election hacking is regime change instigated by bloodless
foreign backed coups. Both election hacking and bloodless coups can
constitute regime change and most significantly, both involve limiting a
State’s political independence by installing an illegitimate regime of the
offending State’s choice. While it is true that an offending State may
hack in support of the incumbent in the election hacking context, the
incumbent would no longer represent the victim State’s true choice in
leadership. Such a move would be analogous to a foreign-backed coup
where a previously democratically elected leader lost an election and,
with the help of a foreign government, simply nullified the results
instead of stepping down. That leader would no longer be able to claim
to represent the sovereign will of the victim State.15
Section II defines and explores the related concepts of Critical
State Infrastructure and Essential State Functions. This section argues
that election infrastructure constitutes both Critical Infrastructure as
well as an Essential State Function. The Critical Infrastructure
designation is an important gauge of what States view as essential
functions, which is highly relevant in determining whether a specific
15. See Georg Nolte, Intervention by Invitation, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA PUB. INT’L
L., http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1702?
prd=EPIL (last updated Jan. 2010) (describing how Afghanistan’s leader invited the Soviets to
intervene in an internal conflict on his behalf, but was himself overthrown and killed two days
into the intervention, raising doubts about the legitimacy of the initial invitation); see also G.A.
Res. ES-6/2 (Jan. 14, 1980) (describing the Soviet intervention as an “Armed Intervention” and a
sovereignty violation, heavily implying that it did not recognize the invitation presented by the
new puppet government to the Soviets as a legitimate expression of Afghanistan’s sovereign
will).
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attack constitutes a violation of sovereignty, an unlawful intervention,
an unlawful use of force, or all three.
Section III is divided into two parts. Section A argues that election
hacking constitutes a violation of sovereignty according to the 1928
Island of Palmas Arbitration’s articulation of sovereignty.16 Section B
argues that election hacking constitutes a prohibited intervention in line
with the I.C.J decision, Case Concerning the Military and Paramilitary
Activities in and Against Nicaragua (hereinafter Nicaragua Judgment).
This case dealt with the United States’ active support of armed rebel
groups, the Contras, against the Nicaraguan government during the
1980s, and provides an authoritative and uncontroversial statement on
what constitutes a prohibited intervention according to customary
international law.17
Section IV takes a consequences-based approach to determine
whether election hacking rises to the level of a use of force. This means
it gives heavy weight to the actual effects of the attack, rather than
making the existence of a kinetic equivalent of the cyber-action
determinative in deciding whether it constitutes a use of force, an armed
attack, or neither.18 This section will make use of the Tallinn Manual’s
proposed factors to determine if an action rises to the level of a use of
force. These factors include the severity of the consequences (the most
important factor), the immediacy of the consequences, the directness
between the attack and the consequences of the attack, the invasiveness
of the attack, the measurability of the attack’s effects, the military
character of the attack, State involvement in the attack (for the purposes
of this note, State involvement will be assumed), and finally, the
presumptive legality of the action.19 This section applies these factors
and the reasoning in the Nicaragua Judgment to foreign backed coups
and election hacking in order to ensure conformity with existing
expressions of customary international law.20
Section V analyzes whether election hacking rises to the level of
an armed attack. The analysis is almost identical to the use of force
analysis with the added factor of intent, borrowed from the Case
Concerning Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.) Judgment.21 This section
16. Agreement Concerning Island of Palmas, Neth.-U.S., Jan. 23, 1925, 2 R.I.A.A. 829.
17. GRAY, supra note 14, at 75.
18. YAROSLAV RADZIWILL, CYBER-ATTACKS AND THE EXPLOITABLE IMPERFECTIONS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 138 (2014).
19. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 5, at 333-336.
20. See GRAY, supra note 14, at 75.
21. Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. Rep. 161, ¶¶ 51, 64, 67, 89, (Nov. 6)
[hereinafter Oil Platforms, Judgment].
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acknowledges that not all uses of force will rise to the level of an armed
attack. This distinction is important because an armed attack may
trigger a State’s inherent right of self-defense, which is in essence a
lawful use of force to stop an attack, while a lesser use of force will
not.22 Using the severity analysis from Section IV, Section V will argue
that international law should recognize the possibility that election
hacking may rise to rise to the level of an armed attack. This note does
not seek to give States an excuse to inflict violence on each other. It
only seeks for international law to recognize the seriousness of election
hacking so that the international community may more effectively
cooperate to deter such behavior.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF INTERVENTIONS AND THEIR EQUIVALENTS IN
CYBER-SPACE
States have interfered in each other’s internal affairs, including
elections, long before the advent of cyber-space. Professor Calder
Walton, an Ernest May Fellow at the Kennedy School of Government
who specializes in espionage research, classifies such interventions as
“active measures.”23 These measures range from mere propaganda
campaigns intended to influence a foreign State’s public opinion,
intervening in elections themselves by funding preferred candidates, to
covert acts of force aimed at regime change.24
At the less invasive end of the active-measures spectrum lie
propaganda campaigns. Walton describes how, during the 1984 United
States presidential election, the Soviet Union detested President Ronald
Reagan25 and spread propaganda via an infiltration campaign of the
Democratic National Committee to suggest that Reagan’s election
would mean war.26 While the technology changed, analogous
interventions took place in 2017, when Russia, the Soviet Union’s
successor State, was accused by Spanish officials of using online social
media to “heavily promote Catalonia’s independence referendum…in

22. Karl Zemanek, Armed Attack, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA PUB. INT’L L., ¶¶ 4, 8,
http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e24
(last
updated Oct. 2013).
23. Calder Walton, “Active Measures:” A History of Russian Interference in US Elections,
PROSPECT MAG. (Dec. 23, 2016), http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/science-and-technology/
active-measures-a-history-of-russian-interference-in-us-elections.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
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an attempt to destabilize Spain.”27 Spain claimed that it detected a
number of fake accounts on social media, half of which it traced back to
Russia.28 This type of interference was similar to Russia’s alleged
efforts to sow division and undermine other elections, most notably in
the United States election of 2016.29
More invasive than spreading propaganda, States have taken more
aggressive steps in interfering in each other’s elections by directly
supporting their preferred candidates. The United States, for example,
intervened in the Italian election of 1948. Not only did the United States
spread damaging misinformation about Socialist candidates in a
propaganda campaign, but it also used the CIA to funnel money to
support moderate candidates to ensure a reliably anti-Communist Italian
government came to power.30 The United States’ direct monetary
support of preferred Italian candidates constituted a more severe
intervention and a higher degree of control over the outcome than a
simple misinformation campaign.
Even more serious interventions can be found in the modern cyber
context. Russia, for instance, allegedly launched a three-pronged cyberattack on Ukraine in its 2014 election.31 Russia first allegedly used a
friendly hacker group, CyberBerkut, to “shut down Ukraine’s Central
Election Commission’s computer systems by disrupting the internal
network.”32 While the Ukrainian government was able to get the system
back online in time for the election, Russia also allegedly attempted to
falsify vote totals of the preliminary results, which would have declared
ultra-nationalist Dmytro Yarosh the winner, when, in reality, he
received less than one percent of the vote.33 The Ukrainian government
caught the change before publicly releasing the preliminary results.34
Finally, Russia allegedly launched Distributed Denial of Service
Attacks against Ukraine’s voter tallying system, which effectively
27. Spain Sees Russian Interference in Catalonia Separatist Vote, REUTERS, (Nov. 13, 2017,
8:23 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-spain-politics-catalonia-russia/spain-sees-russianinterference-in-catalonia-separatist-vote-idUSKBN1DD20Y.
28. Id.
29. Mak, see supra note 1.
30. See Walton, supra note 23.
31. Jason Le Miere, Russia Election Hacking: Countries Where the Kremlin Has Allegedly
Sought to Sway Votes, NEWSWEEK (May 9, 2017, 5:55 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/russiaelection-hacking-france-us-606314.
32. Gabe Joselow, Election Cyberattacks: Pro-Russia Hackers Have Been Accused in Past,
NBC NEWS (Nov. 3, 2016, 2:18 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/mach/technology/electioncyberattacks-pro-russia-hackers-have-been-accused-past-n673246.
33. Le Miere, supra note 31.
34. Joselow, supra note 32.
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blocked election results for two hours, though the final results were
deemed a “genuine election” by international observers.35
These alleged attacks against Ukraine’s elections by Russia were
particularly egregious, and were likely part of its overall campaign to
undermine Ukraine, which included even more serious actions like
Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea.36 It is, however, important to note
that Russia did not alter the actual ballots or the final vote totals, and
thus did not alter the ultimate outcome of the election.37 While effective
and incredibly invasive, these efforts still allow the victim State a
measure of choice. Because Russia left the final vote totals alone, it can
be inferred that the intent behind the hack was not to instigate regime
change, but rather to undermine trust in the Ukrainian election process.
Similarly, and to a far lesser extent, the CIA certainly influenced the
1948 Italian election, but it did not completely usurp the Italian State’s
election process as its people were still free to accept or reject the CIA’s
misinformation and elect a candidate of their choice. While one can
argue the choice was corrupted by the offending State, the choice in
leadership was ultimately still the victim State’s own. These
interventions therefore do not rise to the most serious type of active
measures: regime change.
One infamous example of foreign-instigated regime change was
the 1953 coup in Iran. Sixty-four years later, the CIA admitted to, and
released details pertaining to, its involvement in the 1953 Coup that
removed Iranian Nationalist leader Mohammad Mossadegh.38 In 1953,
the CIA colluded with a number of high ranking conspirators in the
Iranian army and government in an effort to remove Mossadegh for
nationalizing Iran’s oil industry.39 Ironically, the coup almost failed
soon after it began.40 Mossadegh had somehow caught wind and almost
foiled the coup.41 The coup only succeeded when Kermit Roosevelt Jr.,
35. Mark Clayton, Ukraine Election Narrowly Avoided ‘Wanton Destruction’ From
Hackers, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (June 7, 2014), https://www.csmonitor.com/World/
Passcode/2014/0617/Ukraine-election-narrowly-avoided-wanton-destruction-from-hackers.
36. Daniel Treisman, Why Putin Took Crimea: The Gambler in the Kremlin, FOREIGN AFF.
(Apr. 18, 2014), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2016-04-18/why-putin-tookcrimea.
37. Joselow, supra note 32.
38. Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, 64 Years Later, CIA Finally Releases Details of Iranian
Coup, FOREIGN POL’Y (June 20, 2017, 1:43 PM), http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/06/20/64-yearslater-cia-finally-releases-details-of-iranian-coup-iran-tehran-oil/.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. History of Iran: A Short Account of 1953 Coup Operation Code-name: TP-AJAX, IRAN
CHAMBER SOC’Y (Nov. 21, 2017), http://www.iranchamber.com/history/coup53/coup53p2.php.
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the CIA’s head operative in Iran, ignored an order from his superiors to
abandon the mission.42
After discovering the plot, Mossadegh dissolved the Iranian
parliament in an effort to consolidate power, but this only aided the
American effort by making him appear authoritarian.43 Roosevelt and
General Zahedi, a high-ranking Iranian conspirator who had gone into
hiding, figured that the coup could succeed so long as they convinced
the population that the Shah had signed two decrees: one removing
Mossadegh from office and a second making Zahedi the “lawful” Prime
Minister.44 After much intrigue, the CIA helped smuggle key coup
plotters into the embassy compound to prepare for the coup once the
prime minister’s guard was down.45 While the CIA ultimately lost
control of the situation, pro-Shah crowds began to gather, the Shah’s
decrees were finally published in Iranian newspapers, and Roosevelt
helped General Zahedi out of hiding and get to a radio station where he
spoke to the nation as the “rightful” prime minister and cemented the
new regime’s power.46
The 1953 coup is a prime example of regime change carried out by
one State’s agents against another State without resorting to a full-scale
invasion. By forcibly replacing Mossadegh with a leader of their choice,
the United States and its allies effectively deprived the Iranian State of
its political independence. This subtler and (relatively) bloodless form
of regime change is an appropriate analogy for international law when
considering the implications of election hacking. If, for instance,
Russian efforts in Ukraine had not stopped at changing the preliminary
results but had also altered the ballots or the final results to suggest their
chosen candidate won, Russia would have gone beyond sabotage and
completely usurped Ukraine’s internal process of choosing its leaders
and thus its political independence.
While it is true that a military coup uses force in the conventional,
physical sense and election hacking does not, both utilize Critical
Infrastructure within the victim State to achieve the same result: a
traditional coup will utilize the victim State’s existing military
infrastructure to install an illegitimate government of the offending
State’s choice, while an election hack will utilize the victim State’s
election infrastructure to achieve the same result. Both types of regime
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Allen-Ebrahimian, supra note 38.
See History of Iran, supra note 41.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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change are achieved by attacking and using a victim State’s Critical
Infrastructure against it.
II. THE IMPORTANCE OF STATES’ CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
There is currently no universally accepted list of what can
constitute “Critical Infrastructure,” though the counter-terrorism arm of
the U.N. recognizes that Critical Infrastructure encompasses cyber
infrastructures.47 Aside from this acknowledgment and the recognition
of Critical Infrastructure’s importance, the U.N has not defined it,
instead “recognizing that each State determines what constitutes its
critical infrastructure.”48 Despite the lack of a definition, the existence
of, and need for, protection of Critical Infrastructures within States is
still a widely accepted idea in the international community and
supported by a number of treaties and U.N resolutions.
In 2004, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a
resolution entitled, the “Creation of a Global Culture of Cybersecurity
and the Protection of Critical Information Infrastructures,” which urges
member States to protect their Critical Information Infrastructures, a
subset of Critical Infrastructure, to achieve cyber-security.49 The
resolution goes on to encourage member States to share their “best
practices” with the rest of the international community to ensure better
international cyber-security.50 Finally, the resolution encourages
member States to trace breaches to their infrastructure and report the
source of the attacks, specifically, in order to prevent and respond to
them.51 The existence of this resolution indicates that States take
intrusions into their Critical Infrastructures very seriously, which not
only implies a general obligation under customary international law not
to interfere in or otherwise sabotage other States’ Critical Infrastructure,
but also implies that such an attack is much more likely to be considered
an unlawful intervention, if not a use of force. Despite recognizing the
concept of Critical Infrastructures, the fact that the resolution leaves its

47. U.N. Office of Counter-Terrorism, Protection of Critical Infrastructure Including
Vulnerable Targets, Internet, and Tourism Security, https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/ctitf/
en/protection-critical-infrastructure-including-vulnerable-targets-internet-and-tourism-security
(last visited Oct. 14, 2018).
48. S.C. Res. 2341 (Feb. 13, 2017).
49. See generally G.A. Res. 58/199, Creation of a Global Culture of Cybersecurity and the
Protection of Critical Information Infrastructures, (Dec. 23, 2003).
50. Id. at 2.
51. Id. at Annex: ¶¶ 4, 7, 9.
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definition up to individual States makes it difficult to determine a clear,
customary international law definition.52
The practice of leaving the definition of Critical Infrastructure up
to member States can also be found in a 2004 agreement between the
United States and Canada to protect the border and their respective
“Critical Infrastructure.”53 Similar to the General Assembly Resolution,
this treaty defines Critical Infrastructure as, “Governmental and/or
private activities or sectors that are identified by each party in its laws,
executive orders, or policies as ‘Critical Infrastructure.’”54 We must
therefore turn to Canadian and United States domestic law respectively.
Canada has a broad approach, defining its Critical Infrastructure as,
“processes, systems, facilities, technologies, networks, assets, and
services essential to the health, safety, security, or economic well-being
of Canadians and the effective functioning of government” (emphasis
added), which can easily be read to include Election Infrastructure.55
The United States, by contrast, more narrowly defines Critical
Infrastructure as “certain national infrastructures [that] are so vital that
their incapacity or destruction would have a debilitating impact on the
defense or economic security of the United States.”56
Initially,
the
United
States
specifically
included
“telecommunications, electrical power systems, gas and oil, storage and
transportation, banking and finance, transportation, water supply
systems, emergency services…and [a vague] continuity of government”
in its list of what constitutes Critical Infrastructure.57 Only as recently as
January 6, 2017 did the United States Department of Homeland Security
designate its elections systems as Critical Infrastructure under the
“Government facilities” sector, which also includes national monuments
and icons, and education facilities.58 In defining “election
infrastructure,” then-head of the Department of Homeland Security, Jeh
52. Id. at 1.
53. Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United
States of America for Cooperation in Science and Technology for Critical Infrastructure
Protection and Border Security, Can.-U.S., Dec. 12, 2001, T.I.A.S. No. 04-601, art. I [hereinafter
U.S.-Can. Agreement].
54. Id.
55. PUB. SAFETY CAN., NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE, 2 (2009)
(emphasis added), https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/srtg-crtcl-nfrstrctr/srtg-crtclnfrstrctr-eng.pdf.
56. Exec. Order No. 13,010, Critical Infrastructure Protection, 61 Fed. Reg. 37, 347 (July
15, 1996).
57. Id.
58. U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMM’N, STARTING POINT: U.S. ELECTION SYSTEMS AS
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE, 1-2 (2017), https://www.eac.gov/assets/1/6/starting_point_us_
election_systems_as_Critical_Infrastructure.pdf.
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Johnson, enumerated storage facilities, polling places, and centralized
vote tabulations locations used to support the election process, and
information and communications technology to include voter
registration databases, voting machines, and other systems to manage
the election process and report and display results on behalf of state and
local governments.59
Given the discretionary nature of Critical Infrastructure, some
scholars are wary about using it as a basis to determine violations of
international law, especially in terms of an unlawful use of force, as
States may abuse the Critical Infrastructure concept by interpreting it
too widely to justify an otherwise unjustifiable use of force as selfdefense.60 While this fear is understandable, the classification of election
infrastructure as Critical Infrastructure in international law is warranted,
as will be explored below.
The European Union maintains a 2008 treaty, with similar
provisions to the 2000 U.S.-Canada Treaty, which seeks to identify and
protect its member States’ Critical Infrastructure.61 The European Union
defined Critical Infrastructure as an,
[A]sset, system, or part thereof located in Member States
which is essential for the maintenance of vital societal
functions, health, safety, security, economic or social wellbeing of people, and the disruption or destruction of which
would have a significant impact in a Member State as a result
of the failure to maintain those functions.62
The European Union’s definition, while more restrictive than
previous iterations which leave the “Critical Infrastructure” entirely up
to the States, is more in line with existing international law notions of
sovereignty, non-intervention, and human rights. For instance, the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) adopted
by the U.N General Assembly states,
Every citizen shall have the right and opportunity, without any
of the distinctions mentioned in article 2 and without
unreasonable restrictions: (a) To take part in the conduct of
public affairs, directly or through freely chosen
59. Press Release, Secretary Jeh Johnson, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Statement by Secretary
Jeh Johnson on the Designation of Election Infrastructure as a Critical Infrastructure Subsector
(Jan. 6, 2017), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/01/06/statement-secretary-johnson-designationelection-infrastructure-critical#wcm-survey-target-id.
60. RADZIWILL, supra note 18, at 138.
61. Council Directive 2008/114/EC, supra note 13, at art. 1.
62. Id. at art. 2, § (a).
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representatives; (b) To vote and to be elected at genuine
periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal
suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the
free expression of the will of the electors.63
It is important to note that not every “vital” societal interest will
constitute an “essential state function” under international law. To
constitute an “essential state function,” the function must govern a
matter that international law gives States exclusive control over.64
Following the European Union’s understanding of Critical
Infrastructure, and applying it to the ICCPR, States’ election systems
are not only vital to societies that have elections, but also they are
“essential” to those States’ internal decision-making processes and their
governments’ legitimacy in the eyes of the local population,
international human rights law, and traditional principles of State
sovereignty. As the mechanism that facilitates the voting requirements
of the ICCPR and through that, State decision-making, election systems
embody a nexus between popular and State sovereignty. Election
systems therefore constitute both Critical Infrastructure and the
essential State function of choosing its own leaders. An attack on
election infrastructure, cyber or otherwise, therefore constitutes an
attack on a State’s Critical Infrastructure and essential State function,
which in turn invokes the overlapping international law concepts of
sovereignty, unlawful interventions, and use of force.
III. SOVEREIGNTY AND UNLAWFUL INTERVENTIONS IN THE ELECTION
HACKING CONTEXT
A. Sovereignty in Essential State Functions
The first question is what exactly states have sovereignty over. The
1928 Island of Palmas Arbitral Award, a case involving a territorial
dispute between the Netherlands and United States, articulates a widely
accepted definition of Sovereignty:
Sovereignty in the relations between States signifies
independence. Independence in regard to a portion of the globe
is the right to exercise therein, to the exclusion of any other

63. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, pt. III, art. 25, Dec. 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171.
64. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 205 (June 27) [hereinafter Military and Paramilitary Activities,
Judgment]; see also Agreement Concerning Island of Palmas, supra note 16, at 838.
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State, the functions of a State . . . Territorial sovereignty. . .
involves the exclusive right to display the activities of a State.65
On the surface, the territorial definition of sovereignty poses a
unique problem in the cyber context since cyber-space is not a physical
space. But cyber-space cannot exist, at least currently, without physical
manifestations that anchor it to the physical world. Moreover, these
physical manifestations, such as servers, data centers, and undersea
cables that connect cyber processes, are analogous to “key terrain”
targeted in conflict like the high ground in land battles and sea lines in
naval ones.66 The Tallinn Manual came to the conclusion that States
exercise sovereignty over not only the physical manifestation of cyber
infrastructure, but also the “logical and social layers” of their
infrastructure, with “the physical layer consisting of the physical
network components, the logical layer consisting of the connections that
exist between network devices, and the social layer consisting of
individuals engaging in cyber activities.”67 This is not just a
recommendation, however, and according to international cyber law
expert, Yaroslav Radziwill, many States currently do claim sovereignty
over “their” cyberspace, especially when the physical infrastructures
that support it are located within their territory.68
While sovereignty over the physical manifestations of cyber
infrastructure is not disputed when such infrastructure lies within the
physical territory of a State, the question still exists as to whether States
maintain sovereignty over “their” cyber-space that is not represented by
physical components located entirely or mostly within the State’s
territory.69 Still, election infrastructure is State Critical Infrastructure
governing an essential State function over which the State has a right to
maintain exclusive control. Therefore, a fair reading of the Island of
Palmas decision echoed in the Nicaragua Judgment extends beyond
territorial sovereignty and gives States sovereignty over all their
essential functions. States have a right to decide freely the
65. Agreement Concerning Island of Palmas, supra note 16, at 838-39.
66. John R. Mills, The Key Terrain of Cyber, GEO. J. INT’L. AFF. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 2012, at
99-100 (crediting Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) with coming up
with the principles of “key terrain, which refers to “vital ground” that must be gained to get the
upper hand on an opponent).
67. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 5, at 12.
68. RADZIWILL, supra note 18, at 107.
69. See Kurt Mackie, Microsoft Dublin Datacenter Case Getting Supreme Court Review,
REDMOND MAG. (Oct. 16, 2017), https://redmondmag.com/articles/2017/10/16/microsoft-dublindatacenter-case.aspx (explaining how the U.S government tried to force Microsoft to turn over
data stored overseas, but Microsoft refused. This raises issues of sovereignty over data beyond the
scope of this note that have not yet been resolved).
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implementation of all their essential functions, regardless of the (lawful)
method or location they choose to execute them in.70 This means that
State A would maintain sovereignty over its essential functions even
when those functions are carried out within a consenting State B’s
infrastructure.
The second question with regard to sovereignty is its violation.
According to the Tallinn Manual, “Cyber operations that prevent or
disregard another State’s exercise of its sovereign prerogatives
constitute a violation of such sovereignty and are prohibited by
international law.”71 The Tallinn Manual’s suggested rule in regard to
cyber-space is consistent with the sovereignty rights outlined in the
Island of Palmas decision and Nicaragua Judgment. Because States
maintain exclusive rights over their essential State functions, meddling
with those functions does not require kinetic damage to find a breach of
sovereignty. What matters, especially in the cyber context, is if one
State has inserted itself into an essential State function of another State
without that State’s consent.
By breaking into a State’s election system physically or via a
cyber-attack and altering the vote count, a State will violate the victim
State’s sovereignty because it will have usurped the essential State
function of vote counting. A State’s election infrastructure and vote
counting process goes to the heart of its leadership selection process and
therefore its political independence. Whether the new leader chosen by
the offending State actively serves the offending State or not, or indeed
whether the offending State’s chosen candidate “wins” their election at
all, does not matter for the purpose of finding a violation of sovereignty.
By breaking into and attempting to usurp the essential State functions of
vote counting and choosing its leaders, the offending State has violated
the sovereignty of the victim State if one reads customary international
law as recognizing State sovereignty over their essential State functions.
Not only does such election hacking constitute a breach of the victim
State’s sovereignty, it constitutes an unlawful intervention as well.
B. Coups and Election Hacking: The Ultimate Unlawful Intervention
Closely intertwined with the concept of sovereignty is the principle
of unlawful intervention. The prohibitions of unlawful intervention and
unlawful use of force are customary international laws, and the
Nicaragua Judgment provides an authoritative statement on the law in
70. Military and Paramilitary Activities, Judgment, supra note 64, ¶ 205.
71. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 5, at 17.
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this area.72 For an intervention to be considered “unlawful,” according
to the Nicaragua Judgment,
The principle [of non-intervention] forbids all States or groups
of States to intervene directly or indirectly in internal or
external affairs of other States. A prohibited intervention must
accordingly be one bearing on matters in which each State is
permitted, by the principle of State sovereignty (italics added),
to decide freely. One of these is the choice of a political,
economic, social and cultural system, and the formulation of
foreign policy. Intervention is wrongful when it uses methods
of coercion in regards to such choices, which must remain free
ones.73
To summarize, to be considered an unlawful intervention, an
action taken against a State by one or more other States must contain
two elements. First, the action must be carried out by a State or agents
the State retains effective control over, who then interfere in matters
which are “solely the responsibility of the inner State actors,” such as an
essential State function.74 Second, the action must contain an element of
coercion. Coercion means the application of various kinds of pressure
including but not limited to threats, intimidation, and the use of force to
compel one State to think or act in a certain way.75
In addition to the Nicaragua Judgment’s statement on customary
international law, the U.N Charter provides its own prohibition on both
force and interventions more generally when it states, “All members
shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the
United Nations (emphasis added).”76 It is that latter clause, “in any other
manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations,” which is
most relevant to the non-intervention principle.77
The General Assembly clarified the non-intervention principle in
its Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly
72. GRAY, supra note 14, at 75.
73. Military and Paramilitary Activities, Judgment, supra note 64, ¶ 205.
74. Philip Kunig, Intervention, Prohibition of, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA PUB. INT’L L.
¶ 1, http://etron.lls.edu:2177/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1434?
rskey=TqufOg&result=1&prd=EPIL (last updated Apr. 2008).
75. Christopher Joyner, Coercion, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAW ¶ 1, http://etron.lls.edu:2177/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690e1749?rskey=jxgt4o&result=1&prd=EPIL (last updated Dec. 2006).
76. U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4.
77. Id.
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Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the
Charter of the United Nations. The declaration states,
The General Assembly … convinced that the strict observance
by States of the obligation not to intervene in the affairs of any
other State is an essential condition to ensure that nations live
together in peace with one another, since the practice of any
form of intervention not only violates the spirit and letter of the
Charter, but also leads to the creation of situations which
threaten international peace and security… solemnly proclaims
the following principles ….78
The resolution goes on to state that, “States shall conduct their
international relations in the economic, social, cultural, technical and
trade fields in accordance with the principles of sovereign equality and
non-intervention,”79 which includes “the duty not to intervene in matters
within the domestic jurisdiction of any State, in accordance with the
Charter.”80 Given the U.N. charter wording and General Assembly
clarifications, the customary international law principle of nonintervention is a cornerstone of U.N. principles, and military force is not
a prerequisite for violating the law of non-intervention.
On the surface, the element of coercion may seem to require some
kind of threat and demand made by the offending State of the victim
State for an unlawful intervention to exist under international law.
However, the key phrase in the I.C.J. decision is “choices which must
(emphasis added) remain free ones.”81 One reason the United States ran
afoul of the non-intervention principle in the Nicaragua Judgment was
because the United States provided weapons and logistical support to
armed bands actively trying to overthrow the Sandinista government;82
thus threatening the State’s choice in political systems, and as a result,
its political independence. Or to put it another way, the actions of the
United States were coercive because they tried to compel the
Nicaraguan State to change to a regime more favorable to the United
States. Both election hacking and coups are analogous to this kind of
coercion directed at the heart of State Sovereignty: its choice in
leadership.

78. G.A. Res. 25/2625, annex, Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning
Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations, at 2 (Oct. 24, 1970).
79. Id. at 6.
80. Id. at 3.
81. Military and Paramilitary Activities, Judgment, supra note 64, ¶ 205.
82. Id. ¶ 241.
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While the Nicaragua facts largely concern uses of force, the
ruling’s wording, when considered alongside the Declaration on
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations, suggests
that any action that usurps or attacks an essential State function or a
State’s political independence will likely constitute a violation of the
norm of non-intervention, regardless of the presence of military force.
While it is true that some interventions, such as spreading propaganda,
are so minor they likely lack the coercive element necessary to be
considered unlawful interventions, election hacking and coups
invariably have that coercive element by usurping choice entirely in a
way that mere propaganda does not.
In the case of a foreign-backed coup, the offending State takes
control over elements within the victim State’s military infrastructure to
forcibly install a regime of the offending State’s choice, thus usurping
the results of the victim State’s essential internal function of choosing
its leaders. In the case of election hacking, the Tallinn Manual
unequivocally declares ballot tampering via cyber-attacks an “illegal
intervention.”83 This conclusion is consistent with the elements outlined
in the Nicaragua Judgment. Because the requirement is coercion, the
question is whether election hacking constitutes an attempt by one State
to compel another State to act in a certain way. In the election-hacking
context, by hacking into State B’s election infrastructure which has been
shown to be Critical Infrastructure regulating the essential State
Function of vote counting, State A is effectively using its cyber power
to usurp State B’s sovereign right to elect the leader of its choice.
According to the Declaration of Friendly Relations among States,
choosing one’s own leadership must remain a free choice.84 By hacking
into and altering State B’s election outcome, State A has hijacked
Critical Infrastructure within State B and used it to usurp an essential
State function that goes to the heart of State B’s political independence.
It has therefore unlawfully interfered in a choice that must remain free
by coercing the victim State into choosing a leader against its will.
IV. ELECTION HACKING AS A USE OF FORCE
Article 2(4) of the U.N. charter, which respected commentators
such as Christine Gray regard as a codification of customary
international law,85 reads, “All Members shall refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against the
83. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 5, at 313.
84. G.A. Res. 25/2625, supra note 78, at 5.
85. GRAY, supra note 14, at 76.
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territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”86 As in
the case of unlawful intervention, the charter largely leaves the term
“use of force” up to interpretation with concern for territorial integrity
and political independence of member States at the forefront. The
Tallinn Manual experts extrapolate that a “[c]yber operation constitutes
a use of force when its scale and effects are comparable to non-cyber
operations rising to the level of a use of force.”87 This standard is
problematic in that it fails to account for the possibility that as the world
increasingly relies on the Internet, a destructive cyber-attack may not
have a non-cyber equivalent. This standard is better seen as temporary
until cyber-norms have a chance to develop into customary international
law of their own, but for now, it serves as a useful bridge to connect
existing international law governing physical attacks to their cyber
equivalent. Drawing this link is especially useful in the use of force
context to persuade commentators unwilling to characterize an action as
a use of force unless they can analogize it to well-established forms of
force, hence the analogy of election hacking to a foreign-backed coup.
The scope of the prohibition of the use of force is subject to much
debate even in the physical realm, and the line between an unlawful
intervention and an unlawful intervention that constitutes a use of force
is a fuzzy one.88 The most widely accepted definition among
commentators on the prohibition against the use of force comes from
the Nicaragua Judgment.89 There, the court makes clear how the
prohibition against force significantly overlaps with the prohibition
against unlawful intervention; immediately following its discussion of
prohibited interventions, the opinion states,
The element of coercion, which defines and indeed forms the
very essence of, prohibited intervention, is particularly obvious
in the case of an intervention which uses force, whether in the
direct form of military action, or in the indirect form of support
for subversive or terrorist armed activities within another State.
General Assembly resolution 2625 (XXV) equates assistance
of this kind with the use of force by the assisting state when
the acts committed in another state involve a threat or use of
force. These forms of actions are therefore wrongful in the

86.
87.
88.
89.

U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4.
TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 5, at 330.
GRAY, supra note 14, at 30.
Id. at 75.
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light of both the principle of the non-use of force and that of
non-intervention.90
The United States had funded the Contra rebels against the
Sandinista government of Nicaragua and also supplied them with
weapons and logistical support.91 While the funding alone only
constituted a violation of the principle of non-intervention and violation
of sovereignty,92 directly attacking oil platforms, placing mines at
Nicaraguan ports, and arming the rebels constituted a breach of
Nicaragua’s sovereignty, a violation of the norm of non-intervention,
and a prohibited use of force.93 Supplying an armed group with weapons
was a trifecta of unlawful use of force, unlawful intervention, and
violation of sovereignty, while supplying an armed group with money
was only an unlawful intervention and violation of sovereignty.94 Still,
the court did not establish that the kind of force leveled against
Nicaragua was the minimum threshold of what constitutes a use of force
against a State. The court did lay out a “scale and effects” test related to
the use of force, but this test was to determine whether an already
established use of force was tantamount to an armed attack, which,
unlike a lesser use of force, could trigger the victim State’s right of selfdefense against the aggressor State.95 Without a similar test for what
constitutes a use of force to begin with, scholars have been left to debate
the minimum threshold.
This note takes a “contextualist” approach in its use of force
analysis, which contends that coercion is a common element of
unlawful interventions and unlawful uses of force, and that
interventions fall along a continuum ranging from relatively noninvasive interventions that lack a coercive element like propaganda, to
unlawful interventions like funding a rebel army, and prohibited uses of
force and armed attacks.96 The contextualist approach is also effectscentric and holds that international law should classify actions by the
harm to the victims and the aims of international law as represented by
90. Military and Paramilitary Activities, Judgment, supra note 64, ¶ 205.
91. Id. ¶ 241.
92. Id. ¶¶ 228, 251.
93. Id. ¶ 251.
94. Id. ¶¶ 228, 251.
95. Id. ¶ 195; see also Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. Rep. 161,
¶¶ 51, 64 (Nov. 6) [hereinafter Oil Platforms, Judgment] (following the Nicaragua court’s
reasoning in distinguishing armed attacks from lesser uses of force to hold that Iran’s attack on
the ship, Sea Isle City, did not constitute an armed attack and, therefore, did not trigger a right of
self-defense from the U.S.).
96. See generally Heather Harrison Dinniss, Cyber Warfare and the Laws of War 62-63
(2006).
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the U.N. charter without requiring that harm to be physical in nature.97
This school is represented by scholars such as Michael Schmitt, who is
best known for his work in the realm of international cyber-law.98
The contextualist approach is especially helpful in the cyber realm
since cyber-attacks can result in non-kinetic, but still catastrophic
damage to a State’s interests as well as to the U.N. charter’s goals of
peace, stability, and respecting the political independence of its member
States.99 Because of its flexibility, the Tallinn Manual embraces this
contextualist approach in a multi-factor “scale and effects” test derived
from the Nicaragua Judgment and Schmitt’s writings to determine when
a cyber-attack rises to the level of a use of force.100 Because the
Nicaragua Judgment draws a distinction between a use of force and an
armed attack by using a scale and effects test to determine the line
between them, it is logical to apply a similar scale and effects test to
determine the line between a coercive act that constitutes an unlawful
intervention and one that constitutes an unlawful use of force. The
Tallinn Manual framework is extremely useful in the election hacking
context. This note will therefore apply the Tallinn Manual factors as far
as they align with the Nicaragua Judgment’s reasoning to determine if
election hacking constitutes a use of force.
To define the “scale and effects” test laid out in the Nicaragua
Judgment, the Tallinn Manual adopts a test analyzing eight factors to
determine if a particular action rises to the level of a use of force
including severity, immediacy of the consequences, directness between
the attack and its consequences, invasiveness of the action,
measurability of the attack’s effects, military character of the attack,
state involvement, and presumptive legality of the action.101 All
“reasonably foreseeable consequences” of the cyber-attack may be
considered for the use of force analysis.102 For example, if State A arms
a rebel group in State B, a reasonably foreseeable consequence is the
use of those weapons against State B’s government. Thus, that effect
may be considered in determining whether arming the rebel group
97. Id.; see also Nicholas Tsagourias, Cyber Attacks, Self-Defense, and the Problem of
Attribution, 17 J. Conflict & Security L. 229, 231 (2012) (claiming that any attack on a “critical
state infrastructure that paralyses or massively disrupts the apparatus of the State should be
equated to an armed attack, even if it does not cause any immediate human injury or material
damage.” The commentator cites an attack on a State’s financial system that “causes massive
disruption to the economic life of a State” as an example.).
98. See Schmitt, supra note 11.
99. See U.N. Charter art. 1, ¶ 2, art. 2, ¶¶ 1-4.
100. Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 5, at 331.
101. Id. at 334-36.
102. Id. at 343.
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constitutes a use of force. Similarly, if State A alters the ballots and / or
vote count for State B’s election, an illegitimate government coming to
power in State B is a reasonably foreseeable consequence and may be
considered in the use of force factors test.
A. Severity
The severity of the attack, which is the most important and
determinative factor, analyzes the scale of harm to the victim State,
subject to a de minimis test where physical harm to individuals or
property will always qualify as a use of force regardless of the intent
behind the action, while attacks generating mere “inconvenience or
irritation” will not.103 Arming rebels as in the Nicaragua case would
meet this test, assuming the weapons were used and hit their targets, and
would likely cross this threshold even if the rebels ousted the
government with the threat of force alone as in a bloodless coup. By
contrast, propaganda that simply irritates the victim state and
inconveniences it by introducing a harmful narrative to combat but
otherwise causes no damage will never constitute a use of force. But
when harm is not physical and there is no obvious threat of physical
force, this factor will look at the “critical national interests” affected and
the scope, duration, and intensity of the attack’s consequences.104
The nature of the target is critical here, and an attack on critical
State Infrastructure should be considered strongly indicative of meeting
the dispositive severity factor. A minority of the Tallinn Manual’s
experts who back this view argue that an attack on a State’s Critical
Infrastructure should be considered an armed attack if the consequences,
kinetic or otherwise, are severe enough.105 For the purposes of this
analysis, a Critical Infrastructure designation is strongly indicative of a
State’s “Critical National Interest,” since the designation requires States
to view the infrastructure as important enough to their national interest
to label them “Critical” in the first place.106
Election infrastructure is a vehicle for the internal decision-making
process that must remain exclusive to the State, as per the customary
international law definition of sovereignty outlined in the Island of
Palmas decision.107 It is the assault on this process rather than physical
damage to the voting machines that cause the most damage to a State;
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id. at 136, 334.
Id. at 334.
Id. at 343, 345.
Exec. Order No. 13,010, 61 Fed. Reg. at 37347.
Agreement Concerning Island of Palmas, supra note 16, at 838.
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machines can be repaired, but if the process itself is attacked by altering
vote counts, even if the attack is discovered and corrected, a major
consequence will be a loss of faith by the victim State’s populace in its
election infrastructure. This loss of confidence is especially significant
in democratic forms of government which derive their legitimacy from
their people’s faith that the process accurately reflects the popular
will.108 The consequences of a successful hack are even more severe.
Election infrastructure represents the essential State function of
choosing its own leaders, which is central to a State’s political
independence and also its sovereignty.109 A significant and especially
severe consequence of election hacking is the usurping of an essential
State function in choosing its leaders if the hacking is not detected in
time. Even if the election hacking aided the incumbent rather than the
opposition party, a successful, uncorrected attack still usurps the
internal decision-making process of the State and through that its
political independence, as the incumbent no longer reflects the popular
will reflected by the State’s unaltered internal process.
The ultimate goal and, arguably, the most severe consequence of
actions such as election hacking, orchestrating a coup, and supporting
armed rebel groups is to usurp a State’s political independence. The
Tallinn Manual recognizes the severity of targeting and removing a
State’s leadership when it declared that a cyber-attack that kills a head
of State abroad is tantamount to not just a use of force but an armed
attack as well.110 The fact that election hacking achieves this goal
without physical violence does not minimize the threat or damage to a
State’s political independence by the rightful leader’s removal nor does
it matter if the offending State does not control the usurpers once they
take power.111 Indeed, the effects of election hacking on a victim State’s
political independence have the potential to be even more severe than
those of an assassination since election hacking not only removes a
rightful leader from power, but also decides the successor. Because of
the nature of the attack, the nature of the targets (in this case an attack
on a State’s Critical Infrastructure that usurps an essential State
function), and the severity of the consequences of assaulting a State’s
108. W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International
Law, 84 AM. J. INT’L L. 866, 868-69 (1990).
109. Agreement Concerning Island of Palmas, supra note 16, at 838.
110. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 5, at 346.
111. See Military and Paramilitary Activities, Judgment, supra note 64, ¶ 115 (explaining that
the Nicaragua Court established an “effective control” test in order to find one State responsible
for the paramilitary group’s actions. However, this standard is used to establish State
responsibility, not severity).
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very political independence, customary international law’s prohibition
of the use of force should at a minimum be read to include election
hacking.
B. Immediacy of the Consequences
The second factor that the Tallinn Manual describes is the
immediacy of the consequences. This factor reasons that the quicker the
consequences of an attack manifest themselves, the less time States
have to peacefully resolve the dispute or otherwise mitigate the harmful
effects. Therefore, States will be more likely to treat attacks with
immediate consequences as a use of force compared to attacks where
the consequences have a slow-drip effect that builds over time.112 In the
case of election hacking, this factor may lean against finding a use of
force since there could be months in between the revealing of the false
vote totals and the new illegitimate leader ascending to office. On the
other hand, the transition of power would potentially begin immediately
after the election is called.113 Still, this factor is less critical to the
analysis than the severity factor, as evidenced by the Nicaragua court
finding that arming rebels can constitute an unlawful use of force.114 The
actual effects of that support may not have been felt for months after the
fact, but that did not at all mitigate finding an unlawful use of force in
the court’s reasoning.115 Far more important is where the consequences
lie in the chain of causation described below.
C. Directness of the Consequences
The third factor considers the directness between the attack and its
consequences. Essentially, an attack where the direct consequences are
slight, but lead to greater indirect harm in the chain of causation, are
less likely to be deemed a use of force by States than attacks that cause
direct harm.116 Applying this reasoning to the Nicaragua Judgment, the
direct consequence of the United States arming the Contras was armed
attacks carried out by the Contras, while the direct consequence of
simply funding the Contras was one step removed: they had to purchase

112. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 5, at 334.
113. See Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Trump’s Transition in a ‘Long History’ of Rocky
Presidential Handovers, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 16, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/
2016/11/17/us/politics/obama-white-house-transition.html (describing how the transfer of power
in the United States normally begins within days after the election).
114. Military and Paramilitary Activities, Judgment, supra note 64, ¶ 95.
115. Id. ¶¶ 195, 237.
116. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 5, at 334.
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their own armaments before they could carry out armed attacks. Even
though the reasonably foreseeable consequences of funding the Contras
were the Contras arming themselves and carrying out attacks with those
armaments, the court reasoned that directly arming them constituted a
use of force, while merely providing funding did not.117 Following this
reasoning, the direct consequences of election hacking are the changing
of the ballots and the installing of an illegitimate government; there is
no intermediary step. Unlike the case of arming rebels or organizing a
coup, where action by the rebels or coup plotters is required before the
harm occurs, there is no intermediary independent action required by
the State precisely because the ballots themselves represent the State’s
independent decision. By altering them, the offending State has
effectively removed that independent choice from the victim State,
making the consequences of election hacking extremely close to the
attack in the chain of causation. The directness factor between the attack
and the harm therefore leans in favor of a use of force.
D. Invasiveness of the action
The fourth factor is invasiveness. This factor analyzes how secure
the hacked system is, with more secure systems indicating a greater
degree of importance to the victim State: the more secure the system,
the more likely its hacking will be viewed as a use of force.118
Additionally, the Tallinn Manual experts fold in an ‘intent’ analysis
where the more the effects of an attack are limited to the targeted state,
the more invasive the attack will be perceived.119 However, the Tallinn
Manual experts make clear that mere espionage will never be enough to
constitute a use of force on its own, regardless of how invasive the
operation, unless the espionage damages the networks in the process.120
Still, the effectiveness of a country’s security measures, or lack thereof,
do not necessarily indicate the importance of the infrastructure being
hacked, and the Tallinn Manual experts merely provided one method of
determining the importance of different cyber infrastructures to a State.
The invasiveness factor should therefore not depend on the difficulty of
the hack alone. Rather, the invasiveness analysis should focus on the
nature of the target and how closely it is tied to essential State functions,
the State’s sovereignty, and if it qualifies as Critical Infrastructure.

117.
118.
119.
120.

Military and Paramilitary Activities, Judgment, supra note 64, ¶¶ 109, 118.
TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 5, at 334.
Id. at 335.
Id.
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In the case of election hacking, the invasiveness analysis is very
similar to the severity analysis given election systems’ likely status as
Critical Infrastructure and their central role in a State’s decision-making
process that goes to the heart of its political independence. Additionally,
the effects of election hacking are very deliberate and very limited to
whichever State systems were hacked. Thus, the invasiveness analysis
heavily leans in favor of finding a use of force.
E. Measurability of Effects
The fifth factor is the measurability of effects. This factor reasons
that the more apparent and quantifiable the consequences of the
operation are, the more likely a State will be willing to characterize an
action as a use of force.121 Applying this factor to the Nicaragua
Judgment’s reasoning, there was a measurable number of arms supplied
to the Contras, and their use resulted in measurable harm. This factor
essentially requires an attack to have an objective measure of damage to
lean in favor of a use of force. In the case of election hacking, there are
measurable effects: the number of ballots altered, or the difference
between the manufactured results and the real results, are easily
measurable numbers. In the coup context, somewhat ironically, the
“objective and measurable” criteria are lacking in that the only
“measurable harm” will be the damage and collateral damage involved
in removing the old regime, which may very well be minimal if the
coup is efficient enough. In the case of coups, as in the case of election
hacking, what is ultimately threatened are the political independence
and sovereignty of States, which are not easily quantifiable principles.
However, their respect lies at the heart of customary international law as
well as the U.N. Charter.122 It would therefore be highly illogical to
consider an assault on them less likely to constitute a use of force
simply because the offending State figured out a way to usurp a victim
State’s political independence without inflicting easily quantifiable
harm. Thus, even if the effects of an attack are largely subjective, they,
as in the case of attacks that usurp a country’s political independence
and sovereignty, can still be extremely severe. The severity factor is
therefore, ultimately, the most important factor and significantly
outweighs the measurability of effects in the eight-part test.

121. Id. at 335-336.
122. U.N. Charter art. 1, ¶ 2, art. 2, ¶¶ 1–4.
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F. Military Character of the Attack
The sixth factor is the military character of the attack. This factor
is a holdover from the traditional view of the use of force, and thus
makes a “military character” attack more likely to be considered a use
of force than an attack without “military character.”123 The Tallinn
Manual justifies the inclusion of this factor by citing the U.N. Charter’s
preamble, which reads, “We the Peoples of the United Nations
determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of
war. . .And for these ends. . .to ensure. . .that armed force shall not be
used, save in the common interest.”124 “Military Character” therefore
implies a type of armed force employed by State militaries against a
victim State’s military targets.125 The Nicaragua court made particular
issue of the type of aid provided by the United States to the Contras, and
application of this factor to the court’s reasoning helps to explain why
supplying rebel soldiers with weapons to fight a State’s government, a
clearly militaristic action, is more likely to constitute a use of force than
simply providing that same rebel group with funds that can be used for a
variety of purposes.126 A foreign backed coup may invoke this “military
character” factor by utilizing the offending State’s intelligence
apparatus to control elements within the victim State’s military to
achieve forcible regime change, as demonstrated by the U.S.-backed
coup in Iran.127 Similarly, the scale of a successful election hacking
operation may utilize an offending State’s military infrastructure in
carrying out cyber-attacks, which would give the attack a military
character.128 But, election hacking may also lack this military character
as an offending State may be able to utilize lone hackers unaffiliated
with its military. In addition, the targeted election systems, while
Critical Infrastructure, are not understood to have a military character.129
123. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 5, at 336 (citing to the DOD MANUAL: OFFICE OF
GENERAL COUNSEL U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (June 2015), para.16.3.1: “Cyber
operations that cripple a military’s logistics systems, and thus its ability to conduct and sustain
military operations, might also be considered a use of force under jus ad bellum”).
124. U.N. Charter, Preamble.
125. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 5, at 336.
126. Military and Paramilitary Activities, Judgment, supra note 64, ¶ 228.
127. History of Iran, supra note 41.
128. See China Military Unit ‘Beyond Prolific Hacking’, BBC NEWS (Feb. 19, 2013),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-21502088 (discussing the rumors of how a cyberunit of the Chinese military is responsible for stealing “hundreds of terabytes of data from at least
141 organizations all around the world.” If the hackers are indeed associated with the Chinese
military, this attack could be said to have a “military character” under the Tallinn Manual’s
parameters).
129. U.S. Election Assistance Commission, supra note 58, at 1.
THE
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Still, because of election Infrastructure’s deep ties to a State’s
sovereignty and political independence, the severity factor should
significantly outweigh the possible lack of military character in the
election hacking context.
G. State Involvement
The seventh factor is State involvement and, through that, State
responsibility. This factor asserts that the clearer the “nexus” between
the attack and its official agencies, the more likely a victim State will
consider the attack a use of force.130 For the purposes of this note, it is
assumed that the offending State maintains “effective control” over the
agents responsible for hacking into State B’s election systems.131 By
extension, State responsibility is pre-assumed for the purposes of the
election hacking analysis.
H. Presumptive Legality
The eighth and last factor is presumptive legality. This factor
reasons that because “international law is generally prohibitive in
nature, acts that are not forbidden are permitted.”132 If an action is not
considered a different violation of international law under existing rules,
a State is less likely to consider the action an unlawful use of force. A
relevant example here is the spreading of propaganda to influence a
State’s populace: the action is not considered an unlawful intervention
or even a violation of sovereignty and, thus would be highly unlikely to
constitute a use of force.133 By contrast, every time the court in the
Nicaragua Judgment found an action to constitute an unlawful use of
force, it had also found that same action to constitute another
international law violation, usually a violation of sovereignty and/or
unlawful intervention.134 This is not to say that an additional
international law violation is a prerequisite to the existence of an
unlawful use of force but merely that if one action violates international
law for a different reason, it increases the chance the illegal action will
constitute a use of force as well. And, if the action is not presumably
illegal, it is less likely to be seen as an unlawful use of force.
130. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 5, at 336.
131. See Military and Paramilitary Activities, Judgment, supra note 64, ¶ 115 (describing
how a State must have “effective control” over a group in order to be held legally responsible for
the actions of said group).
132. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 5, at 336.
133. Id.
134. Military and Paramilitary Activities, Judgment, supra note 64, ¶¶ 228, 241, 251.
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Because election hacking is already presumed illegal, in that it
violates State sovereignty and constitutes an unlawful intervention, and
because the measurability of the effects factor, invasiveness factor,
directness factor, and all-important severity factor all heavily lean in
treating election hacking as a use of force, international law should
recognize election hacking as an unlawful use of force as well.
V. ELECTION HACKING AS AN ARMED ATTACK
As a general rule, an armed attack will always constitute a use of
force, but a use of force may not always rise to the level of an armed
attack.135 This distinction between a use of force and armed attack
matters because an armed attack can trigger a State’s right to individual
and collective self-defense, while a use of force below that threshold
does not.136 All the factors that were analyzed in the use of force section,
including reasonably foreseeable consequences, directness, and severity,
also apply to determining whether the action rises to the level of an
armed attack. But, because self-defense, to be lawful, must be both
proportional and necessary to repel the armed attack suffered,137 victim
States must also consider the intent of the offending State as well as
whether the action is sufficiently grave to justify an armed response.
Intent and meeting the graveness threshold are not factors; they are
necessary elements in finding an armed attack.
A. Intent
The court in Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), a case that involved the
attack on a U.S. ship with Iranian sea mines, implied that a lack of
intent will mitigate against finding that an individual use of force
constitutes an armed attack.138 If an attack was accidental, future attacks
are unlikely to follow, so any force used in response to the accidental
attack would be a retaliation rather than an act of self-defense.
Conversely, as in the case of a coup or election hacking, regime change
constitutes the explicit intent behind both operations. Therefore, the
“intent” element should be satisfied in both election hacking as well as a
135. Oil Platforms, Judgment, supra note 21, at 187, 191.
136. Id.; see also U.N. Charter art. 51, ¶ 1 (“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the
inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack (italics added) occurs
against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary
to maintain international peace and security.”).
137. Christopher Greenwood, Self-Defence, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL
LAW,
http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law9780199231690-e401?prd=EPIL (last updated Apr. 2011).
138. Oil Platforms, Judgment, supra note 21, ¶¶ 51, 64.
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foreign-backed coup. But intent alone is not dispositive of an armed
attack; it is merely a necessary element.
B. The Graveness Threshold
The current customary international law as described in the
Nicaragua Judgment is vague in describing when a use of force rises to
the level of an armed attack, saying only that its scale and effects must
be sufficiently “grave.”139 In the cyber context, experts are divided on
the type of approach to use, with some advocating a “strict liability”
approach which would treat any attack on a State’s Critical
Infrastructure as an armed attack, and others advocating an effectsbased approach, which looks at the scope and severity of the attack’s
effects.140 The strict liability approach, while tempting in its simplicity,
suffers due to a lack of consensus regarding what constitutes “Critical
Infrastructure” in the first place as well as the fact that the effects on
said Critical Infrastructure may be minor.141 The effects-based approach,
on the other hand, more closely resembles the Nicaragua Judgment’s
focus on the actual consequences of the attack and thus is the approach
this note embraces.142 Therefore, consideration of the nature of the
target, e.g. election infrastructure that has been demonstrated to
constitute Critical Infrastructure, will be folded into the severity
analysis which will determine if an action is sufficiently “grave” to
constitute an armed attack.
C. The Consequences to Consider
As in the use of force analysis, the Tallinn Manual’s experts
unanimously agreed that only “reasonably foreseeable consequences”
should be considered in determining if a use of force constitutes an
armed attack.143 For instance, if an attack targets a water purification
plant, the damage to the plant will, in and of itself, constitute a use of
force, but the resulting sicknesses from tainted water should also be
taken into account when deciding if that use of force rises to the level of
an armed attack because sickness from tainted water is a reasonably
foreseeable consequence of an attack on a water purification center.144
Similarly, in the coup and election hacking contexts, regime change and
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Military and Paramilitary Activities, Judgment, supra note 64, ¶¶ 191, 195.
RADZIWILL, supra note 18, at 138.
Id.
Id.
TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 5, at 343.
Id.
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a limiting of the victim State’s political independence are reasonably
foreseeable consequences of that kind of attack.
D. Directness
The armed attack analysis, to be consistent with the Nicaragua
Judgment, must weigh the “directness” factor more stringently than in
the use of force analysis.145 Even though the United States clearly
intended the weapons it supplied to the Contras to be used in armed
attacks against the Nicaraguan government and that their use was a
highly foreseeable consequence, the court was not willing to classify
arming rebel group as an armed attack.146 The act of supplying the
weapons was one step removed from their use in the chain of causation
that caused the damage. In order to hold the United States responsible
for the armed attacks carried out with the supplied weapons, Nicaragua
needed to demonstrate that the United States maintained “effective
control” over the Contras’ actions and that the Contras were “subject to
the United States to such an extent that any acts they have committed
are imputable to that State,” which it had failed to do.147 The foreignbacked coup context may suffer from a similar directness problem since
the offending State will invariably work with internal actors within the
victim State, similar to the United States working with the Contras in
Nicaragua. Merely providing these actors with the means to achieve
regime change, given the Nicaragua standard, will not be enough to
classify this use of force as an armed attack. The victim State would
have to demonstrate that the offending State had “effective control”
over the coup plotters.148 Election hacking, by contrast, does not trigger
the directness problem.
As explained in the use of force analysis, an election hack does not
suffer from an indirectness classification precisely because there is no
friendly agent required in the victim State. If a State provided actors
within another State with the means to hack into their own election
systems and instructed them in how to achieve this, that would be
analogous to arming a rebel army, and the Nicaraguan court’s “effective
control” standard would have to be demonstrated before ruling the
incident an armed attack. However, with a direct hack, there is no
friendly intermediary required within the victim State; there is only the
direct attack into a State’s Critical Infrastructure. This means that the
145.
146.
147.
148.

Military and Paramilitary Activities, Judgment, supra note 64, ¶ 195.
Id.
Id. ¶¶ 115-16.
Id.
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more stringent directness factor does not weigh against treating direct
election hacking as an armed attack. With the more stringent directness
factor and intent factor weighing in favor of an armed attack, the only
factor left to consider is severity.
E. Severity
The severity analysis in the armed attack context is similar to the
use of force analysis. The Advisory Council on International Affairs
took the position, since adopted by the Netherlands, that a cyber-attack
must be regarded as an ‘armed attack’ within the meaning of Article 51
of the U.N. Charter if it causes (or has the potential to cause) serious
disruption to the functioning of the [S]tate or serious or prolonged
consequences for the stability of the [S]tate, even if there is no physical
damage or injury, with a de minimis recommendation against counting a
mere “impediment” or “delay” of State functions.149 So, while a cyberattack that merely slows down the voting machines or otherwise
confuses the voters may not pass the de minimis threshold, altering the
election results almost certainly does. First, election hacking attacks the
State’s Critical Infrastructure itself. Second, as in the case of a coup,
election hacking usurps the essential State function of choosing its own
leaders. Finally, it installs an illegitimate government against the victim
State’s wishes, which, in turn, usurps the victim State’s political
independence.
It must be acknowledged that the Nicaragua Judgment was
unwilling to find the existence of an “armed attack” that did not involve
some sort of physical damage or “armed bands . . . on a significant
scale.”150 At first glance, it may seem like hackers constitute a loophole
to this “armed bands” standard. However, many States incorporate
cyber-activities into their militaries and intelligence agencies. Russia,
for instance, maintains a dedicated unit of “internet trolls” that wages
propaganda campaigns against its perceived enemies.151 China maintains
a figurative army of hackers that launch ninety thousand attacks a year
against U.S. Defense Department computers.152 A hacker force armed
with cyber-weapons descending upon a State’s Critical infrastructure
149. Advisory Council on International Affairs, Cyber Warfare, No. 77, AIV/No. 22, CAVV
36 (Dec. 2011).
150. Military and Paramilitary Activities, Judgment, supra note 64, ¶ 195.
151. Maya Kosoff, The Russian Troll Farm that Weaponized Facebook had American Boots
on the Ground, VANITY FAIR (Oct. 18, 2017, 9:44 AM), https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2017/
10/the-russian-troll-farm-that-weaponized-facebook-had-american-boots-on-the-ground.
152. Gerald Posner, China’s Secret Cyberterrorism, THE DAILY BEAST (Jan. 12, 2010, 8:02
PM), https://www.thedailybeast.com/chinas-secret-cyberterrorism.
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should logically meet this “armed band” standard. The avenue of attack
should not matter. What matter are the scale and effects of the attack.
CONCLUSION
Many international law commentators are resistant to classifying
attacks that do not result in death or physical destruction as a use of
force or armed attack. Though the Tallinn Manual experts more readily
accept that non-kinetic attacks can constitute a use of force, some of its
experts still take the position that a non-kinetic use of force can never
rise to the level of an armed attack.153 However, the purpose at the heart
of self-defense—prohibitions on the use of force, unlawful
interventions, and violations of State sovereignty—is to protect the
political independence and “sovereign equality” of States.154 Surely, an
attack that threatens every one of these principles at once must qualify
as among the gravest uses of force. The classification of election
hacking as a violation of sovereignty, unlawful intervention, and use of
force that may rise to the level of an armed attack is not a call to arms. It
is a call to reality in recognizing the severity of usurping a State’s
political independence.

153. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 5, at 342.
154. U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 1.

